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EVERYONE KNOWS THAT SOMEONE KNOWS:
QUANTIFIERS OVER EPISTEMIC AGENTS
PAVEL NAUMOV AND JIA TAO
Abstract. Modal logic S5 is commonly viewed as an epistemic logic that captures the
most basic properties of knowledge. Kripke proved a completeness theorem for the first-
order modal logic S5 with respect to a possible worlds semantics. A multiagent version of
the propositional S5 as well as a version of the propositional S5 that describes properties of
distributed knowledge in multiagent systems has also been previously studied. This article
proposes a version of S5-like epistemic logic of distributed knowledge with quantifiers
ranging over the set of agents, and proves its soundness and completeness with respect to
a Kripke semantics.
§1. Introduction. Several propositional modal logics including S5 were first
proposed by Lewis and Langford [10]. The study of first-order modal logics was
initiated in Barcan [2] by introducing a logical principle that connects modalities
and quantifiers: ∀x2φ → 2 ∀xφ. This principle is commonly referred to as
the Barcan formula. Any propositional modal logic such as T, S4, etc. could
be transformed into a first-order modal logic by extending the language and
adding standard axioms and inference rules for quantifiers. Generally speaking,
the Barcan formula is not provable in such systems. Thus, it is common to
consider versions of predicate modal logics with and without the Barcan formula.
Sometimes, the converse Barcan formula is considered as well [7]. An exception
to this general rule is the modal logic S5. Prior showed that the Barcan formula
is provable in the predicate version of this logical system [12].
Kripke proved the completeness of first-order S5 with respect to a possible
world semantics [9]. Cresswell developed a technique for proving the complete-
ness of first-order modal logics with respect to classes of Kripke models with
constant domains [4]. Among other logical systems, his technique is also appli-
cable to S5. Fine investigated a “second-order” version of S5 with quantifiers
ranging over propositions [6].
Propositional modal logic S5, especially the multiagent version of this system,
is often viewed as the default epistemic logic. Many epistemology-focused exten-
sions of S5 have been proposed before. Of particular interest to us is an extension
of S5 that captures properties of distributed knowledge [5, p.73]. This logical sys-
tem investigates a modality 2Aφ which stands for “a group of agents A has dis-
tributed knowledge of statement φ”. Informally, a group of agents knows a state-
ment distributively if the statement follows from the combination of the informa-
tion available to the agents in this group. An example of a universal property of
distributed knowledge captured in this system is 2a,bφ ∧2b,cψ → 2a,b,c(φ ∧ ψ).
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It states1 that if agents a and b distributively know φ, and agents b and c dis-
tributively know ψ, then agent a, b, and c together distributively know φ ∧ ψ.
In this article we add quantifiers over agents to the language of the logic of
distributed knowledge. For example, in the language of our logical system one
can write statement ∀x (2xφ → 2xψ). This statement means that every agent
who knows statement φ also knows statement ψ. It is different, for instance,
from the statement ∀x2xφ → ∀x2xψ, which says that if every agent knows φ,
then every agent must know ψ. Another example of a statement in our language
is ∀x ∀y (2x,yφ→ 2xφ∨2yφ). It means that “if any two agents know statement
φ distributively, then at least one of them must know φ alone”. We assume that
quantifiers range over a domain of agents specified in each model of our logical
system.
An example of a universally true formula in our language is ∀x (2x∃y 2yφ→2xφ), where variable y does not occur in formula φ. Informally, this statement
means “if agent x knows that somebody knows φ, then agent x herself knows
φ”. We show that this statement is derivable in our logical system in Lemma 3.
The situation with the Barcan formula for quantifiers over epistemic agents is
perhaps unexpected. As we show in Section 5, the Barcan formula is not true
in its most general form: ∀x 2Aφ → 2A∀x φ. However, this formula is true
under the restriction x /∈ A. We call this modified formula the restricted Barcan
formula.
The main technical contribution of this article is a sound and complete logical
system for reasoning about distributed knowledge with quantifiers over agents.
This logical system consists of axioms and inference rules of propositional logic
of distributed knowledge, and quantifier axioms and an inference rule similar
to those in the predicate logic. The restricted Barcan formula is provable from
these axioms.
Our proof of the completeness is built on several previous works. We adopt
the derivation of the Barcan formula from Prior [12], we use a simplified version
of C-forms from Cresswell’s proofs [4] of completeness of constant-domain first-
order modal logics, and we employ Sahlqvist’s “unravelling” technique [13] to
construct a multi-agent canonical Kripke model. Although not based on it, our
work is also related to Fitting’s article [8] on quantified logic of evidence where
he adds quantifiers to the logic of justifications [1].
An alternative way to interpret variables in our logic is to consider them rang-
ing over the set of viewpoints of agents rather than the set of agents themselves.
For example, Charrier, Ouchet, and Schwarzentruber consider agents positioned
on a plane at a certain point (x, y) with agents facing a certain direction θ [3].
Variables in this case could be interpreted as ranging over all possible triples
(x, y, θ). Although it might be natural to assume that the number of agents is
finite, the number of viewpoints that an agent can have is likely to be infinite.
Having this more general setting in mind, in this article we make no restrictions
on the cardinality of the domain of agents. Our proof of the completeness theo-
rem yields a Kripke model with an infinite domain of agents just like most other
proofs of completeness theorems for logics with quantifiers.
1We omit curly brackets when we list elements of a set in the subscript of a modality.
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The article is organized as follows. Section 2 and Section 3 define the formal
syntax and semantics of our logical system. Section 4 lists axioms and inference
rules of our system, states the soundness theorem, and gives two examples of
formal proofs in our logical system. Section 5 discusses the validity of the Barcan
formula and the converse Barcan formula. Section 6 proves the completeness
of our logical system with respect to the semantics introduced in Section 3.
Section 7 concludes the article.
§2. Syntax. Throughout this article we assume a fixed countable set V of
“variables” and a fixed at most countable set P of “propositions”. Next we
define2 the language Φ(C) of our logical system for any given set of constants C.
Definition 1. For any set C disjoint with set V , let set Φ(C) be the minimal
set of formulae such that
1. P ⊆ Φ(C),
2. if φ ∈ Φ(C), then ¬φ ∈ Φ(C),
3. if φ, ψ ∈ Φ(C), then φ→ ψ ∈ Φ(C),
4. for any finite set C ′ ⊆ C and any finite set V ′ ⊆ V , if φ ∈ Φ(C) then2C′∪V ′φ ∈ Φ(C),
5. if x ∈ V and φ ∈ Φ(C), then ∀xφ ∈ Φ(C).
The next definition specifies an auxiliary operation of replacement (or substi-
tution) of an element of a set by another element x.
Definition 2. For any set A and any elements x and t, let
A[t/x] =
{
(A \ {x}) ∪ {t}, if x ∈ A,
A, otherwise.
For example, if element 2 is replaced in the set {1, 2, 3} by element 4, then the
result, denoted by {1, 2, 3}[4/2] is the set {1, 3, 4}. At the same time, substitution
{1, 2, 3}[3/2] results in set {1, 3}. Finally, substitution {1, 2, 3}[4/5] does not
change the set because 5 /∈ {1, 2, 3}.
We now use the above definition to define substitution as an operation on
formulae.
Definition 3. For any formula φ ∈ Φ(C), any variable x ∈ V , and any
t ∈ C ∪ V , let substitution φ[t/x] be defined recursively as follows. For each
proposition p ∈ P , each variable y ∈ V , each set A ⊆ C ∪ V , and all formulae
ψ, χ ∈ Φ(C),
1. p[t/x] = p,
2. (¬ψ)[t/x] = ¬(ψ[t/x]),
3. (ψ → χ)[t/x] = ψ[t/x]→ χ[t/x],
4. (2Aψ)[t/x] = 2A[t/x](ψ[t/x]),
5. (∀y ψ)[t/x] is equal to ∀y ψ if y = x; it is equal to ∀y (ψ[t/x]) otherwise.
As an example, the result of substitution (2x,y2y,z∀y 2yp)[z/y] is formula2x,z2z∀y 2yp.
2Modal languages often can be translated into first order languages with quantifiers over
worlds. In our case, a natural translation leads to a two-sorted first order language with
separate quantifiers for epistemic worlds and agents.
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§3. Semantics. In this section we define Kripke-like models of our logical
system. Compared to Kripke models for the propositional modal logic S5, our
semantics also includes a function α that assigns values (agents) to all constants.
Definition 4. For any set C, a Kripke model is a tuple 〈W,A, {∼a}a∈A, α, pi〉,
where
1. W is an arbitrary set of “epistemic worlds”,
2. A is a set of “agents”,
3. ∼a is an (“indistinguishability”) equivalence relation for each a ∈ A,
4. α : C → A is a function that maps constants into agents,
5. pi : P → P(W ) is a function that maps propositional variables into sets of
epistemic worlds.
In this article, we write u ∼X v if u ∼x v for each x ∈ X. The next defini-
tion introduces the update operation on an arbitrary function. This operation
changes the value of the function at a single point.
Definition 5.
f [x 7→ w](t) =
{
w, if t = x,
f(t), otherwise.
Since formulae in our language might have free variables, the meaning of a
formula could only be specified if values are assigned to all free variable in this
formula. We represent this assignment by a function ρ that maps variables into
agents. For any such function ρ, any epistemic world w and any formula φ, the
satisfiable relation (w, ρ)  φ is specified by the definition below.
Definition 6. For any given set C, any Kripke model 〈W,A, {∼a}a∈A, α, pi〉,
and any function ρ : V → A,
1. (w, ρ)  p if w ∈ pi(p),
2. (w, ρ)  ¬φ if (w, ρ) 1 φ,
3. (w, ρ)  φ→ ψ if (w, ρ) 1 φ or (w, ρ)  ψ,
4. (w, ρ)  2Aφ if (u, ρ)  φ for each u ∈W such that w ∼α(A∩C)∪ρ(A∩V ) u,
5. (w, ρ)  ∀xφ if (w, ρ[x 7→ a])  φ for each a ∈ A.
We conclude this section with an auxiliary lemma that connects update and
substitution operations. This lemma is used in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 1. (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  φ iff (w, ρ)  φ[c/x].
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on the structural complexity
of formula φ.
1. Suppose that formula φ is a proposition p. Then φ[c/x] = p by Definition 3.
Thus, by Definition 6, (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  φ iff (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  p iff
w ∈ pi(p) iff (w, ρ)  p iff (w, ρ)  φ[c/x].
2. Suppose that formula φ is a proposition p. Then φ[c/x] = p by Definition 3.
Thus, (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  φ iff (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  p; and also (w, ρ)  p iff
(w, ρ)  φ[c/x]. At the same time, by Definition 6, (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  p iff
w ∈ pi(p). Again by Definition 6, w ∈ pi(p) iff (w, ρ)  p. By combining the
above statements, we get (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  φ iff (w, ρ)  p.
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3. Suppose that formula φ has the form ¬ψ. Thus, by Definition 3, Defini-
tion 6, and the induction hypothesis, (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  φ iff (w, ρ[x 7→
α(c)])  ¬ψ iff (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)]) 1 ψ iff (w, ρ) 1 ψ[c/x] iff (w, ρ)  ¬(ψ[c/x])
iff (w, ρ)  (¬ψ)[c/x] iff (w, ρ)  φ[c/x].
4. Suppose that formula φ has the form ψ → χ. By Definition 6, statement
(w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  ψ → χ is equivalent to the disjunction of statement
(w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)]) 1 ψ and statement (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  χ. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, this disjunction is in turn equivalent to the disjunction of
statement (w, ρ) 1 ψ[c/x] and statement (w, ρ)  χ[c/x]. By Definition 6,
the last disjunction is equivalent to (w, ρ)  (ψ[c/x]) → (χ[c/x]), which is
equivalent to statement (w, ρ)  (ψ → χ)[c/x] by Definition 3.
5. Suppose that formula φ has the form 2Aψ. By Definition 6, statement
(w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  2Aψ is equivalent to (u, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  ψ being
true for all u ∈ W such that w ∼α(A∩C)∪ρ[x 7→α(c)](A∩V ) u. By the in-
duction hypothesis, the last statement is equivalent to (u, ρ)  ψ[c/x]
being true for all u ∈ W such that w ∼α(A∩C)∪ρ[x 7→α(c)](A∩V ) u. By
Definition 2, it is also equivalent to (u, ρ)  ψ[c/x] being true for all
u ∈ W such that w ∼α(A[c/x]∩C)∪ρ(A[c/x]∩V ) u, which is equivalent to
(w, ρ)  2A[c/x](ψ[c/x]) by Definition 6. Finally, the last statement is
equivalent to (w, ρ)  (2Aψ)[c/x] by Definition 3.
6. Suppose that formula φ has the form ∀y ψ, where y 6= x. By Definition 6,
statement (w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  ∀y ψ is equivalent to the claim that (w, (ρ[x 7→
α(c)])[y 7→ a])  ψ for each a ∈ A. Since x 6= y, by Definition 5, the last
statement is equivalent to (w, (ρ[y 7→ a])[x 7→ α(c)])  ψ for each a ∈ A,
which, by the induction hypothesis, is equivalent to (w, (ρ[y 7→ a]))  ψ[c/x]
for each a ∈ A. The last statement, by Definition 6, is equivalent to
(w, ρ)  ∀y (ψ[c/x]), which in turn is equivalent to (w, ρ)  (∀y ψ)[c/x] by
Definition 3.
7. Suppose that formula φ has the form ∀xψ. By Definition 6, statement
(w, ρ[x 7→ α(c)])  ∀xψ is equivalent to the claim that (w, (ρ[x 7→ α(c)])[x 7→
a])  ψ for each a ∈ A. By Definition 5, the last statement is equiva-
lent to (w, ρ[x 7→ a])  ψ for each a ∈ A, which is equivalent to state-
ment (w, ρ)  ∀xψ by Definition 6. The last statement is equivalent to
(w, ρ)  (∀xψ)[c/x] by Definition 3.
a
§4. Axioms. In addition to the propositional tautologies in language Φ(C),
our logical system contains the axioms below. As usual, term t is called free for
a variable x in a formula φ if for any free occurrence of variable x in the formula
φ replacing that occurrence by t does not place any variable in the term t into a
scope of a quantifier.
1. Truth: 2Aφ→ φ,
2. Negative Introspection: ¬2Aφ→ 2A¬2Aφ,
3. Distributivity: 2A(φ→ ψ)→ (2Aφ→ 2Aψ),
4. Monotonicity: 2Aφ→ 2Bφ, where A ⊆ B,
5. Specialization: ∀xφ→ φ[t/x], where t ∈ C ∪ V is free for variable x in φ,
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6. Uniformity: ∀x (φ → ψ) → (φ → ∀xψ), where formula φ contains no free
occurrences of variable x.
We write `C φ if formula φ can be derived from the above axioms using the
Generalization, the Necessitation, and the Modus Ponens inference rules:
φ
∀xφ,
φ
2Aφ,
φ φ→ ψ
ψ
.
For any X ⊆ Φ(C), we write X `C φ if φ is provable from the theorems of our
system formulated in language Φ(C) combined with an additional set of axioms
X using only the Generalization rule and the Modus Ponens rule. We write ` φ
and X ` φ when the value of C is clear from the context.
Theorem 1 (soundness). For any φ ∈ Φ(C), if `C φ, then (w, ρ)  φ for
each Kripke model 〈W,A, {∼a}a∈A, α, pi〉, each world w ∈W , and each function
ρ : V → A.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of verifying the soundness of each axiom and
each inference rule of our system. Although the language of our system is unique,
the above list of axioms is a combination of the axioms of distributed knowledge
logic [5, p.73] and the first-order axioms for quantifiers [11, p.62]. The proofs
of the soundness of these axioms are no different from those of the soundness of
their counterparts in modal and first-order logics.
The next lemma proves a well-known observation that so-called “positive in-
trospection” principle is derivable from the rest of S5 axioms. We use this lemma
in the proof of the completeness of our logical system.
Lemma 2. ` 2Aφ→ 2A2Aφ.
Proof. Note that formula ¬2Aφ→ 2A¬2Aφ is an instance of the Negative
Introspection axiom. Thus, ` ¬2A¬2Aφ→ 2Aφ by the law of contrapositive in
propositional logic. Hence, ` 2A(¬2A¬2Aφ → 2Aφ) by the Necessitation in-
ference rule. Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference
rule,
` 2A¬2A¬2Aφ→ 2A2Aφ.(1)
At the same time, 2A¬2Aφ→ ¬2Aφ is an instance of the Truth axiom. Thus,
` 2Aφ → ¬2A¬2Aφ by contraposition. Hence, taking into account the follow-
ing instance of the Negative Introspection axiom ¬2A¬2Aφ → 2A¬2A¬2Aφ,
one can conclude that ` 2Aφ→ 2A¬2A¬2Aφ. The latter, together with state-
ment (1), implies the statement of the lemma by the laws of propositional rea-
soning. a
We conclude this section with a proof of the example from the introduction.
We assume that ∃y is an abbreviation for ¬∀y ¬.
Lemma 3. ` ∀x (2x∃y2yφ → 2xφ), where variable y does not occur in for-
mula φ.
Proof. By the Truth axiom, ` 2yφ → φ. Thus, by contraposition, ` ¬φ →
¬2yφ. Hence, by the Generalization inference rule, ` ∀y (¬φ → ¬2yφ). Then,
due to the assumption that variable y does not occur in formula φ, by the
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Uniformity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule, ` ¬φ→ ∀y ¬2yφ. Thus,
again by contraposition, ` ¬∀y ¬2yφ→ φ. Recall now that ∃y is an abbreviation
for ¬∀y ¬. Hence, ` ∃y2yφ → φ. Then, by the Necessitation inference rule,
` 2x(∃y2yφ → φ). Thus, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens
inference rule, ` 2x∃y2yφ → 2xφ. Therefore, ` ∀x (2x∃y2yφ → 2xφ) by the
Generalization inference rule. a
§5. Restricted Barcan Formula. Barcan proposed a logical principle [2]
that connects modalities and quantifiers: ∀x2φ→ 2∀xφ. Prior showed that this
principle is derivable in the first-order version of S5 [12]. The natural translation
of the Barcan formula into the language of our logical system is
∀x2Aφ→ 2A∀xφ.(2)
In general, the Barcan formula (2) is not sound with respect to the semantics
of our logical system specified in Definition 6. Indeed, consider the following
instance of this formula: ∀x2x2xp → 2x∀x2xp. Informally, this formula is
not universally true because the knowledge of statement p by all agents does
not imply that all agents know that everyone knows p. More formally, let us
consider a Kripke model depicted in Figure 1. It has three epistemic worlds:
w, u, and v and two agents a and b. Agent a cannot distinguish worlds w and
u, and agent b cannot distinguish worlds u and v. Proposition p is satisfied in
worlds w and u only. Let ρ be any function that maps variable x into agent a.
That is, ρ(x) = a. In Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 we show that (w, ρ)  ∀x2x2xp,
yet (w, ρ) 1 2x∀x2xp.
w u va b
p ¬ pp
Figure 1. (w, ρ) 1 ∀x2x2xp→ 2x∀x2xp
Lemma 4. (w, ρ)  ∀x2x2xp.
Proof. By the definition of the model in Figure 1, we have (w, ρ)  p and
(u, ρ)  p. Thus, (w, ρ)  2a2ap by Definition 6. Hence, (w, ρ[x 7→ a])  2x2xp
by Lemma 1. At the same time, (w, ρ)  p also implies that (w, ρ)  2b2bp by
Definition 6. Hence, (w, ρ[x 7→ b])  2x2xp by Lemma 1. Finally, (w, ρ) 
∀x2x2xp follows from (w, ρ[x 7→ a])  2x2xp and (w, ρ[x 7→ b])  2x2xp by
Definition 6. a
Lemma 5. (w, ρ) 1 2x∀x2xp.
Proof. By the definition of the model in Figure 1, we have (v, ρ) 1 p. Thus,
(u, ρ) 1 2bp by Definition 6. Hence, (u, ρ[x 7→ b]) 1 2xp by Lemma 1. Thus,
(u, ρ) 1 ∀x2xp by Definition 6. Then, (w, ρ) 1 2a∀x2xp by Definition 6.
Hence, (w, ρ[x 7→ a]) 1 2x∀x2xp by Lemma 1. Recall that ρ(x) = a by the
choice of function ρ. Thus, ρ[x 7→ a] ≡ ρ. Therefore, (w, ρ) 1 2x∀x2xp. a
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As we have just seen, the Barcan formula (2) is not universally true for quan-
tifiers over epistemic agents. However, this formula is true under the restriction
x /∈ A.
Lemma 6. If (w, ρ)  ∀x2Aφ, then (w, ρ)  2A∀xφ, for each Kripke model
〈W,A, {∼a}a∈A, α, pi〉, each world w ∈ W , each function ρ : V → A, each
formula φ ∈ Φ(C), and each variable x /∈ A.
Proof. Consider any u ∈W such that w ∼α(A∩C)∪ρ(A∩V ) u. By Definition 6,
it suffices to show that (u, ρ)  ∀xφ. Let a ∈ A be an arbitrary agent. By
Definition 6, it suffices to show that (u, ρ[x 7→ a])  φ.
By Definition 6, assumption (w, ρ)  ∀x2Aφ implies (w, ρ[x 7→ a])  2Aφ.
Thus, by Definition 6, (v, ρ[x 7→ a])  φ for each world v ∈ W such that
w ∼α(A∩C)∩ρ[x 7→a](A∩V ) v. Note that ρ[x 7→ a](A∩V ) = ρ(A∩V ) because x /∈ A.
Hence, (v, ρ[x 7→ a])  φ for each world v ∈ W such that w ∼α(A∩C)∩ρ(A∩V ) v.
In particular, (u, ρ[x 7→ a])  φ. a
We call the Barcan formula (2) under the restriction x /∈ A the restricted
Barcan formula. Not only is the restricted Barcan formula true for quantifiers
over epistemic agents, but it is also derivable from the axioms of our logical
system introduced earlier. We prove this statement in the next lemma. Our proof
of this lemma is a re-worked version of the original Prior’s proof of derivability
of the Barcan formula in the first-order version of S5 [12]. We have explicitly
mentioned in the proof where the assumption x /∈ A is used.
Lemma 7 (restricted Barcan formula). ` ∀x2Aφ→ 2A∀xφ, where x /∈ A.
Proof. By the Specialization axiom, ` ∀x2Aφ → 2Aφ[x/x]. Then it fol-
lows from Definition 3 that ` ∀x2Aφ → 2Aφ. Thus, by contraposition in
propositional logic: ` ¬2Aφ → ¬∀x2Aφ. Hence, by the Necessitation infer-
ence rule, ` 2A(¬2Aφ → ¬∀x2Aφ). Thus, ` 2A¬2Aφ → 2A¬∀x2Aφ by the
Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule. Then, by the Neg-
ative Introspection axiom, ` ¬2Aφ → 2A¬∀x2Aφ. Hence, ` ¬2A¬∀x2Aφ →2Aφ by contraposition. Thus, ` ¬2A¬∀x2Aφ → φ by the Truth axiom.
Then, by the Generalization inference rule, ` ∀x (¬2A¬∀x2Aφ → φ). Hence,
` ¬2A¬∀x2Aφ → ∀xφ, by the Uniformity axiom and the Modus Ponens
rule; the Uniformity axiom can be applied in this setting because x /∈ A due
to the assumption of the lemma. Thus, by the Necessitation inference rule,
` 2A(¬2A¬∀x2Aφ→ ∀xφ). Then, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus
Ponens inference rule, ` 2A¬2A¬∀x2Aφ → 2A∀xφ. Hence, by the Nega-
tive Introspection axiom, ` ¬2A¬∀x2Aφ → 2A∀xφ. Thus, by contraposition,
` ¬2A∀xφ→ 2A¬∀x2Aφ. Then, ` ¬2A∀xφ→ ¬∀x2Aφ by the Truth axiom.
Therefore, ` ∀x2Aφ→ 2A∀xφ by contraposition. a
Sometimes, the converse of the Barcan formula is considered as well [7]. The
restricted form of the converse Barcan formula is also sound with respect to our
semantics. This could be shown in the same fashion as the proof of Lemma 6.
The provability of the converse Barcan formula in our logical system follows from
the completeness theorem.
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§6. Completeness. The rest of this article focuses on the proof of the com-
pleteness of our logical system. As stated in the introduction, this proof is built
on prior works by Cresswell [4] and Sahlqvist [13].
6.1. Initial Observations. We start the proof of the completeness by mak-
ing several technical observations about our formal system. The first of them is
a version of the deduction theorem. Although the proof of this theorem closely
follows the standard proof of the deduction theorem in the first-order logic, we
include the complete proof in this article to show that changing from quantifiers
over the elements of a domain to quantifiers over agents does not alter the proof.
Before stating the deduction theorem, recall that we write X ` φ if formula φ
is provable from the theorems of our system combined with an additional set of
axioms X using only the Generalization rule and the Modus Ponens rule.
Lemma 8 (Deduction). For any set of formulae X ⊆ Φ(C), any closed for-
mula φ ∈ Φ(C), and any formula ψ ∈ Φ(C), if X,φ ` ψ, then X ` φ→ ψ.
Proof. Let χ1, . . . , χn be a proof of formula ψ from additional axioms X,φ.
We prove that X ` φ→ χi by induction on i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Let us consider
the following cases:
1. If ` χi or χi ∈ X, then consider propositional tautology χi → (φ → χi).
By the Modus Ponens inference rule, X ` φ→ χi.
2. If formula χi is derived from χj and χj → χi using the Modus Ponens
inference rule, then formulae χj and χj → χi precede formula χi in the
sequence χ1, . . . , χn. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, X ` φ → χj and
X ` φ→ (χj → χi). Consider propositional tautology
(φ→ (χj → χi))→ ((φ→ χj)→ (φ→ χi)).
By applying the Modus Ponens inference rule twice, we can conclude that
X ` φ→ χi.
3. If formula χi has form ∀xχj for some j < i and is derived from χj by the
Generalization rule, then X ` φ→ χj by the induction hypothesis. Hence,
X ` ∀x(φ → χj) by the Generalization rule. Recall that φ is a closed
formula. Thus, ` ∀x (φ → χj) → (φ → ∀xχj) by the Uniformity axiom.
Therefore, X ` φ→ ∀xχj by the Modus Ponens inference rule.
a
The restricted Barcan formula in the form proven in Lemma 7 is easy to
understand. Lemma 11 below states the same restricted Barcan formula in the
form it is actually used in the proof of the completeness. Proving Lemma 11 from
Lemma 7 is not a trivial task in itself. Our proof utilizes auxiliary Lemma 9 and
Lemma 10.
Lemma 9. ` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ∀xφ), where formula ψ contains
no free occurrences of variable x.
Proof. Note that ` ∀x ((φ → ∀xφ) → ψ) → (((φ → ∀xφ) → ψ)[x/x]) by
the Specialization axiom. Thus, by Definition 3,
` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ).(3)
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At the same time, the formula ((p → q) → r) → (¬r → p) is a propositional
tautology. Thus,
` ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → φ).(4)
From (3) and (4) by the laws of propositional reasoning,
` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → φ).
By the Generalization inference rule,
` ∀x (∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → φ)).
Note that variable x is not free in formula ∀x ((φ → ∀xφ) → ψ). Thus, by the
Uniformity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ ∀x (¬ψ → φ).
Recall that formula ψ contains no free occurrences of variable x due to the
assumption of the lemma. Thus, again by the Uniformity axiom and the laws of
propositional reasoning, ` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ∀xφ). a
Lemma 10. ` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬∀xφ).
Proof. Note that ` ∀x ((φ → ∀xφ) → ψ) → (((φ → ∀xφ) → ψ)[x/x]) by
the Specialization axiom. Thus, by Definition 3,
` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ).(5)
At the same time, the formula ((p → q) → r) → (¬r → ¬q) is a propositional
tautology. Thus,
` ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬∀xφ).(6)
From (5) and (6) by the laws of propositional reasoning,
` ∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬∀xφ).
a
Lemma 11. ` ∀x2A((φ → ∀xφ) → ψ) → 2Aψ, for each closed formula ψ
and each variable x /∈ A.
Proof. By the laws of propositional reasoning, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10
imply ` ∀x ((φ → ∀xφ) → ψ) → ψ. Thus, by the Necessitation inference rule,
` 2A((∀x (φ → ∀xφ) → ψ) → ψ). Hence, by the Distributivity axiom and the
Modus Ponens inference rule,
` 2A∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ 2Aψ.(7)
At the same time, by the restricted Barcan formula (Lemma 7) and the assump-
tion x /∈ A,
` ∀x2A((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ 2A∀x ((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ).
Therefore, due to statement (7), by the laws of propositional reasoning,
` ∀x2A((φ→ ∀xφ)→ ψ)→ 2Aψ.
a
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6.2. Henkin Sets. This section defines Henkin sets for quantifiers over epis-
temic agents and proves their properties that are used in the proof of the com-
pleteness. Although this section does not closely follow Cresswell’s work, most
of the section is inspired by Cresswell [4].
Definition 7. A set of closed formulae H ⊆ Φ(C) is a Henkin set if for any
formula γ ∈ Φ(C) with a single variable x, there is c ∈ C such that c does not
occur in γ and set H contains formula γ[c/x]→ ∀x γ.
Lemma 12. For any at most countable set C and any consistent set of closed
formulae X ⊆ Φ(C) there is an at most countable set C ′ ⊇ C and a consistent
Henkin set H ⊆ Φ(C ′) such that X ⊆ H.
Proof. Let γ ∈ Φ(C) be any propositional formula with a single variable x
and Y ⊆ Φ(C) be any set of formulae. Suppose that h /∈ C. It suffices to show
that if set Y is consistent with respect to `C , then set Y ∪ {γ[h/x] → ∀x γ}
is consistent with respect to `C∪{h}. Suppose the opposite, then Y `C∪{h}
¬(γ[h/x]→ ∀x γ). Consider a derivation of ¬(γ[h/x]→ ∀x γ) from Y . Note that
symbol h could be viewed as a variable rather than a constant. More formally, we
can select a variable z not used anywhere in this derivation and replace constant
h with this variable everywhere in the derivation. Thus, Y `C ¬(γ[z/x]→ ∀x γ).
Furthermore, the following two formulae are propositional tautologies:
¬(γ[z/x]→ ∀x γ)→ γ[z/x],
¬(γ[z/x]→ ∀x γ)→ ¬∀x γ.
Thus, Y `C γ[z/x] and Y `C ¬∀x γ by two applications of the Modus Ponens
inference rule. The first statement, by the Generalization inference rule, implies
that Y `C ∀z (γ[z/x]). Thus, by the Specialization axiom and the Modus Ponens
inference rule, Y `C (γ[z/x])[x/z]. Hence, Y `C γ by Definition 3 and because
variable z does not occur anywhere in formula γ. Therefore, again by the Gen-
eralization inference rule, Y `C ∀x γ, which together with above observation
Y `C ¬∀x γ implies the inconsistency of set Y with respect to `C . a
In the rest of the article we assume that γ1, γ2, . . . is an enumeration of all
formulae with a single free variable in the language Φ(C). For any i > 0, let xi
denote the free variable in formula γi. The statement of the next lemma connects
Henkin sets with the modalities.
Lemma 13. For each Henkin set H ⊆ Φ(C), each A ⊆ C, and each ¬2Aφ ∈
H, there is a sequence c1, c2, · · · ∈ C such that for each n ≥ 0,
H ` ¬2A((γn[cn/xn]→ ∀xn γn)→ (. . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . )).
Proof. First, note that the statement is true for n = 0 due to the assumption
¬2Aφ ∈ H of the lemma. We define sequence c1, c2, . . . recursively. Suppose
that we have already defined c1, . . . , cn ∈ C such that
H ` ¬2A((γn[cn/xn]→ ∀xn γn)→ (. . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . )).
Note that xn+1 /∈ A by the assumption A ⊆ C and formula φ is closed by the
assumption ¬2Aφ ∈ H of the lemma. Thus, by the contrapositive of Lemma 11,
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where ψ in Lemma 11 stands for formula
(γn[cn/xn]→ ∀xn γn)→ (. . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . ),
we have
H ` ¬∀xn+12A((γn+1 → ∀xn+1γn+1)→ ((γn[cn/xn]→ ∀xn γn)→ (. . .
((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . ))).
Hence, it follows from Definition 7 that there is a constant cn+1 ∈ C such that
H ` ¬2A((γn+1[cn+1/xn+1]→ ∀xn+1γn+1)→
((γn[cn/xn]→ ∀xn γn)→ (. . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . ))).
a
The last lemma in this section is our version of the standard lemma in modal
logic used to create a “child node” in a Kripke model.
Lemma 14. Let H be any consistent Henkin subset of Φ(C). For any ¬2Aφ ∈
H there is a consistent Henkin set H ′ ⊆ Φ(C) such that
{¬φ} ∪ {2Aψ | 2Aψ ∈ H} ∪ {¬2Aχ | ¬2Aχ ∈ H} ⊆ H ′.
Proof. Consider a sequence of constants c1, c2, · · · ∈ C from the statement
of Lemma 13. Let H ′ be set
{¬φ} ∪ {2Aψ | 2Aψ ∈ H} ∪ {¬2Aχ | ¬2Aχ ∈ H} ∪ {γi[ci/xi]→ ∀xi γi | i ≥ 1}.
By Definition 7, set H ′ is a Henkin set. It suffices to prove that set H ′ is
consistent. Assume the opposite. Hence, there are formulae 2Aψ1, . . . ,2Aψn ∈
H and formulae ¬2Aχ1, . . . ,¬2Aχm ∈ H, and k ≥ 0 such that
2Aψ1, . . . ,2Aψn,¬2Aχ1, . . . ,¬2Aχm,
γk[ck/xk]→ ∀xk γk, . . . , γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1 ` φ.
Then, after n+m+ k applications of Lemma 8,
` 2Aψ1 → (. . . (2Aψn → (¬2Aχ1 → . . . (¬2Aχm → ((γk[ck/xk]→
∀xk γk)→ . . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . )) . . . )) . . . ).
Thus, by the Necessitation inference rule,
` 2A(2Aψ1 → (. . . (2Aψn → (¬2Aχ1 → . . . (¬2Aχm → ((γk[ck/xk]→
∀xk γk)→ . . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . )) . . . )) . . . )).
Hence, by applying the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference
rule n+m times,
2A2Aψ1, . . . ,2A2Aψn,2A¬2Aχ1, . . . ,2A¬2Aχm
` 2A((γk[ck/xk]→ ∀xk γk)→ . . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . ).
By Lemma 2 applied n times,
2Aψ1, . . . ,2Aψn,2A¬2Aχ1, . . . ,2A¬2Aχm
` 2A((γk[ck/xk]→ ∀xk γk)→ . . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . ).
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By applying the Negative Introspection axiom m times,
2Aψ1, . . . ,2Aψn,¬2Aχ1, . . . ,¬2Aχm
` 2A((γk[ck/xk]→ ∀xk γk)→ . . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . ).
Hence, due to the choice of formulae 2Aψ1, . . . ,2Aψn and ¬2Aχ1, . . . ,¬2Aχm,
H ` 2A((γk[ck/xk]→ ∀xk γk)→ . . . ((γ1[c1/x1]→ ∀x1 γ1)→ φ) . . . ).
The latter implies inconsistency of set H due to the choice of sequence c1, c2, . . . .
This contradicts the assumption of the lemma. a
6.3. Canonical Model. By a maximal consistent Henkin set H0 ⊆ Φ(C)
we mean any maximal consistent subset of Φ(C) which is a Henkin set. In this
section we construct a canonical Kripke model based on a maximal consistent
Henkin set. Such a construction is not trivial even for propositional epistemic
logic of distributed knowledge because one needs to use “unraveling” [13] or a
similar technique. In this section we adapt the “unraveling” technique for our
logic with quantifiers over epistemic agents to define the canonical Kripke model
K(C,H0) = 〈W,C, {∼c}c∈C , α, pi〉 for any set of constants C and any maximal
consistent Henkin set H0 ⊆ Φ(C).
The key element of this technique is to define epistemic worlds not as maxi-
mal consistent sets of formulae, but as sequences of such sets satisfying certain
conditions. The next definition shows how this is done.
Definition 8. The set of epistemic worlds W is the set of all sequences
H0, C1, H1, . . . , Cn, Hn such that
1. n ≥ 0,
2. Hi ⊆ Φ(C) is a maximal consistent Henkin set for each i > 0,
3. Ci is a finite subset of C for each i > 0,
4. {φ | 2Ciφ ∈ Hi} ⊆ Hi+1, for each i ≥ 0.
The next lemma shows that the maximal consistent sets in a sequence repre-
senting an epistemic world share certain 2A-formulae.
Lemma 15. For any H0, C1, H1, . . . , Cn, Hn ∈ W , any 0 ≤ k ≤ n, and any
closed formula 2Aφ ∈ Φ(C), if A ⊆ Ci for each k < i ≤ n, then 2Aφ ∈ Hk iff2Aφ ∈ Hn.
Proof. We prove the lemma by backward induction on k. If k = n, then
the statement of the lemma is a logical tautology. Suppose that k < n. By the
induction hypothesis 2Aφ ∈ Hk+1 iff 2Aφ ∈ Hn. Thus, it suffices to show that2Aφ ∈ Hk iff 2Aφ ∈ Hk+1.
(⇒) Suppose that 2Aφ ∈ Hk. Then, Hk ` 2A2Aφ by Lemma 2. Thus, Hk `2Ck+12Aφ by the Monotonicity axiom and the assumption A ⊆ Ck+1. Hence,2Ck+12Aφ ∈ Hk due to the maximality of set Hk. Therefore, 2Aφ ∈ Hk+1 by
Definition 8.
(⇐) Suppose that 2Aφ /∈ Hk. Thus, ¬2Aφ ∈ Hk due to the maximality of
set Hk. Hence, Hk ` 2A¬2Aφ by the Negative Introspection axiom. Then,
Hk ` 2Ci¬2Aφ by the Monotonicity axiom and the assumption A ⊆ Ci. Hence,2Ci¬2Aφ ∈ Hk due to the maximality of set Hk. Thus, ¬2Aφ ∈ Hk+1 by
Definition 8. Therefore, 2Aφ /∈ Hk+1 due to the consistency of set Hk+1. a
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Next, we define indistinguishability relations on epistemic worlds.
Definition 9. For any epistemic world w = H0, C1, H1, . . . , Cn, Hn ∈ W ,
any epistemic world u = H0, C
′
1, H
′
1, . . . , C
′
m, H
′
m ∈ W , and any c ∈ C, let
w ∼c u if there is k ≥ 0 such that
1. k ≤ n and k ≤ m,
2. Hi = H
′
i and Ci = C
′
i for each 0 < i ≤ k,
3. c ∈ Ci for each k < i ≤ n,
4. c ∈ C ′i for each k < i ≤ m.
Corollary 1. ∼c is an equivalence relation on set W for each c ∈ C.
For any epistemic world w = H0, C1, H1, . . . , Cn, Hn, by hd(w) we denote set
Hn. The following lemma provides intuition behind the above definition of the
indistinguishability relation.
Lemma 16. If w ∼A u, then 2Aφ ∈ hd(w) iff 2Aφ ∈ hd(u).
Proof. Let w = H0, C1, H1, . . . , Cn, Hn and u = H
′
0, C
′
1, H
′
1, . . . , C
′
m, H
′
m,
where H ′0 = H0. Assumption w ∼A u implies that w ∼a u for each a ∈ A. Thus,
by Definition 9, for each a ∈ A there is ka ≥ 0 such that
1. ka ≤ n and ka ≤ m,
2. Hi = H
′
i and Ci = C
′
i for each 0 < i ≤ ka,
3. a ∈ Ci for each ka < i ≤ n,
4. a ∈ C ′i for each ka < i ≤ m.
Consider kmax = max{ka | a ∈ A}; if A = ∅, then let kmax = 0. Thus,
1. kmax ≤ n and kmax ≤ m,
2. Hi = H
′
i and Ci = C
′
i for each 0 < i ≤ kmax,
3. A ⊆ Ci for each kmax < i ≤ n,
4. A ⊆ C ′i for each kmax < i ≤ m.
By Lemma 15, we have 2Aφ ∈ Hkmax iff 2Aφ ∈ Hn. By the same lemma, we
also have 2Aφ ∈ H ′kmax iff 2Aφ ∈ H ′m. Note that Hkmax = H ′kmax . Therefore,2Aφ ∈ Hn iff 2Aφ ∈ H ′m. In other words, 2Aφ ∈ hd(w) iff 2Aφ ∈ hd(u). a
To finish the construction of the canonical model K(C,H0) = 〈W,C, {∼c
}c∈C , α, pi〉, next we specify functions α and pi.
Definition 10. For any c ∈ C, let α(c) = c.
Definition 11. For any p ∈ P , let pi(p) = {w ∈W | p ∈ hd(w)}.
We conclude this section with the lemma that connects the satisfiability rela-
tion in the canonical model with the maximal consistent sets out of which this
model is built.
Lemma 17. (w, ρ)  φ iff φ ∈ hd(w) for each ρ : V → C and each closed
formula φ ∈ Φ(C).
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on the structural complexity
of formula φ. If formula φ is a proposition, then the required follows from
Definition 6 and Definition 11. If formula φ is an implication or a negation, then
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the required follows from Definition 6 and the maximality and the consistency
of the set hd(w) in the standard way.
Suppose that φ is a closed universal formula. Recall that γ1, γ2, . . . is an
enumeration of all formulae in Φ(C) with a single free variable and x1, x2, . . .
are the corresponding free variables in formulae γ1, γ2, . . . . Thus, there must
exist n ≥ 0 such that φ is formula ∀xi γi. Furthermore, by Definition 7, there
must exist c0 ∈ C such that
(γi[c0/xi]→ ∀xi γi) ∈ hd(w).(8)
(⇒) Assume that (w, ρ)  ∀xi γi. Recall that C is the set of agents in the
canonical model K(C,H0). Then, (w, ρ[xi 7→ c])  γi for each c ∈ C by Def-
inition 6. Hence, (w, ρ[xi 7→ c0])  γi. Then, (w, ρ[xi 7→ α(c0)])  γi by
Definition 10. Thus, (w, ρ)  γi[c0/xi] by Lemma 1. Then, by the induction
hypothesis, γi[c0/xi] ∈ hd(w). Hence, hd(w) ` ∀xi γi by the Modus Ponens
inference rule using (8). Therefore, ∀xi γi ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality of the
set hd(w).
(⇐) Suppose that (w, ρ) 1 ∀xi γi. Then, by Definition 6, there must exist c ∈ C
such that (w, ρ[xi 7→ c]) 1 γi. Hence, (w, ρ[xi 7→ α(c)]) 1 γi by Definition 10.
Then, (w, ρ) 1 γi[c/xi] by Lemma 1. Thus, γi[c/xi] /∈ hd(w) by the induction
hypothesis. Hence, hd(w) 0 γi[c/xi] due to the maximality of the set hd(w).
Therefore, ∀xi γi /∈ hd(w) by the Specialization axiom and the Modus Ponens
inference rule.
Finally, let us assume that φ is a closed formula of the form 2Aη. Then,
A ⊆ C and η is also a closed formula.
(⇒) Let w = H0, C1, H1, . . . , Cn, Hn where Hn = hd(w) and suppose that 2Aη /∈
hd(w). Thus, ¬2Aη ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality of the set hd(w). By
Lemma 14, there is a consistent Henkin set H ′ such that
{¬η} ∪ {2Aψ | 2Aψ ∈ Hn} ∪ {¬2Aχ | ¬2Aχ ∈ Hn} ⊆ H ′.
LetHn+1 be a maximal consistent extension of setH
′. Consider the sequence u =
H0, C1, H1, . . . , Cn, Hn, A,Hn+1. Then, u ∈ W by Definition 8. Additionally,
w ∼a u for each a ∈ A by Definition 9. In other words, w ∼A u. At the same time
η /∈ hd(u) because ¬η ∈ H ′ ⊆ Hn+1 = hd(u) and set hd(u) is consistent. Thus,
(u, ρ) 1 η by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, (w, ρ) 1 2Aη by Definition 6.
(⇐) Suppose that 2Aη ∈ hd(w). Consider an arbitrary u ∈W such that w ∼A u.
Then, 2Aη ∈ hd(u), by Lemma 16. Thus, hd(u) ` η, by the Reflexivity axiom.
Then, η ∈ hd(u), due to the maximality of the set hd(u). Hence, (u, ρ)  η by
the induction hypothesis. Therefore, (w, ρ)  2Aη by Definition 6. a
6.4. Completeness Theorem. We are now ready to state and prove the
completeness theorem for our logical system.
Theorem 2. For any at most countable set C and any closed formula φ ∈
Φ(C), if w  φ for each epistemic world w ∈W of each Kripke model 〈W,A, {∼a
}a∈A, α, pi〉, then `C φ.
Proof. Suppose that 0C φ. Thus, {¬φ} is a consistent subset of Φ(C). By
Lemma 12, there is an at most countable set C ′ ⊇ C and a consistent Henkin
set H ⊆ Φ(C ′) such that ¬φ ∈ H. Let H0 be any maximal consistent subset
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of Φ(C ′) such that H ⊆ H0. Consider the Kripke model K(C ′, H0) defined in
Section 6.3 and let epistemic world w be the single-element sequence H0. For
any function ρ from variables to agents, (w, ρ)  ¬φ by Lemma 17. Therefore,
(w, ρ) 1 φ by Definition 6. a
§7. Conclusion. In this article we proposed a logical system for reasoning
about quantifiers over epistemic agents. The main technical result of this article
is the completeness theorem for this logical system.
In Kripke-like semantics of first order modal logics there are usually domains
associated with each epistemic world. The Barcan formula and the converse
Barcan formula are usually thought of as a syntactical way to capture the setting
when the domains do not change from one epistemic world to another. The
semantics of our logical system does not have separate domains for epistemic
states. Instead, we have a set of agents for the entire model. One of the questions
that we addressed in this article is how this setting affects the validity of the
Barcan formula and of its converse. As we have shown, such a setting results in
these formulae to be true only in a restricted form.
The completeness of this logical system with respect to the class of models
with finitely many agents and the decidability of the system are open problems.
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